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Executive Summary 
 
This paper examines how political authorities communicate with one another and to 
their constituencies during democratisation conflicts in Kenya, South Africa and Serbia. 
By adopting a comparative perspective, it aims to situate the logics and practices of 
political communication in the broader political and socio-cultural milieu in which they 
originate and are deployed. It also discusses how narratives and ideologies inform the 
strategies deployed in the conflict, the role of old and new media as it emerges from 
ERWKWKHLQWHUYLHZHHV¶H[SHFWDWLRQVDQGH[SHULHQFHDQGZKDWWKHJDSEHWZHHQWKHVH
two tells us about the transformations that ICTs are prompting in political 
communication: 
 
 A common feature of the conflicts is that they are all seen as a contemporary 
reflection of underlying tensions and deep-seated frustrations rooted in 
inequalities and unresolved issues that predate democratic transition: the 
end of the 0LORãHYLü¶VUHJLPHLQ6HUELD,QGHSHQGHQFHLQWKHFDVHRI.HQ\D
and the end of Apartheid in South Africa.  
 In each case, framing the past sets the stage for interpreting the current 
situation and building a vision of the future. The source of legitimacy of the 
parties involved in the conflicts is, in some cases, placed in transcendent 
YDOXHV VXFKDV6HUELDQ LGHQWLW\&KULVWLDQQRUPV8EXQWXRU ³WKH UXOHRI
ODZ´ 
 Democratisation appears as an unfinished process in the three countries, as 
the tensions between more authoritarian structures of power and institutions 
based on representative democracy are brought to the fore. Moreover, 
media outlets emerge as actors with their own agenda. Market pressures not 
only test the boundaries of quality journalism, but also force politicians and 
state authorities to compete for limited attention by using increasingly 
polarising tones and arguments. 
 
The comparative analysis also offers a glimpse into the use of social media for 
mobilising supporters online and reflecting many of the themes in the mass media, 
including the reproduction of forms of patronage and political co-option, while also 
posing new questions about greater citizen participation and spaces for public 
DXWKRULWLHVWRµOLVWHQ¶WRJUDVVURRWVFRQVWLWXHQFLHV 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines how political authorities communicate with one another and to 
their constituencies in situations of democratisation conflict in Kenya, South Africa and 
Serbia1 . By adopting a comparative perspective, it aims to situate the logic and 
practices of political communication in the broader political and socio-cultural milieu in 
which they originate and are deployed. The underlying assumption is that the study of 
forms of engagement between leaders and the citizens in fragile democratic settings 
reveals underlying ideas of power and participation. It also discusses how narratives 
and ideologies inform the strategies deployed by the different actors involved in the 
FRQIOLFW WKH UROH RI ROG DQG QHZ PHGLD DV LW HPHUJHV IURP ERWK WKH LQWHUYLHZHHV¶
expectations and experience, and what the gap between these two tells us about the 
transformations that ICTs are inducing in political communication. The first part of this 
paper explains the methodology used to collect the data and presents the conflict 
cases by country. The second part delves into the findings, divided into the seven 
sections, each focusing on a topic that recurs throughout the conflict under 
examination. We begin by focusing on the significance of the past as a source of 
political legitimacy within conflicts. We consider how the narratives used by the 
conflicting parties in each case studies make sense of the relationship of the country 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world. We examine the values and the ideologies at the centre 
of the political discourse and, next, how grievances are leveraged to mobilise 
supporters. Then, we discuss the strategies used by the parties to get their messages 
across and we look at the role of the media, focusing on the significance of social 
media. 
 
Country Distribution and 
control of power 
Citizenship Elections Transitional 
justice 
Kenya  Somali community 
(2013-2015) 
Elections 2007, 
2013 
Kenyatta ICC 
Serbia Ombudsman 
(2015) 
Pride Parade 
(2010) 
Elections 2008 0LORãHYLü7KH
Hague (2001) 
South Africa Service delivery 
protests (Balfour 
2009, 2010; 
Zamdela 2012-13); 
State of the Nation 
Address (2015) 
Xenophobic 
violence 
  
                                                          
1
 Due to the current political and security situation in Egypt, the country team encountered unforeseen 
issues during the data collection.  
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1.1. Serbia 
 
The fragmentation of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and the ensuing outbreak of a civil 
ZDULQWKH%DONDQVVWUHQJWKHQHGWKHDXWKRULWDULDQUXOHRI6ORERGDQ0LORãHYLüZKLFK
ended in October 2000, in what Serbian nationalists call the October coup. The 
Democratic Opposition, supported by the civil society, had a key role in toppling 
0LORãHYLüEXWODWHUVSOLWRYHUWKHIXWXUHRIWKHFRXQWU\EHWZHHQDQDWLRQDOLVWZLQJOHGE\
9RMLVODY.RãWXQLFDDQGDOLEHUDOZLQJOHGE\=RUDQĈLQÿLü.RãWXQLFDZHQWWREHFRPH
presLGHQW RI <XJRVODYLD DQG WKHQ 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU RI 6HUELD ZKLOH ĈLQÿLü ZDV
assassinated in 2003. However, the tensions between nationalist and liberal positions 
continued to define alliances and rivalries across the political spectrum, particularly as 
the extUDGLWLRQRI0LORãHYLüDQGWKH,QGHSHQGHQFHRI.RVRYRDSSHDUHGWREHWKHSULFH
to pay to advance the integration process within the EU. Serbian political landscape 
became increasingly polarised between anti- and pro-EU supporters. The themes 
recurrent throughout the Serbian case studies are thus the relation with the past, the 
subordination of the legislative and judiciary to the executive, with implications for 
media independence and freedom of speech in general, and the preservation of 
Serbian values and (imagined) identity. 
 
7KH 0LORãHYLü ,&7< 7ULDO - 7KH DUUHVW RI IRUPHU <XJRVODYLD¶V 3UHVLGHQW 6ORERGDQ
0LORãHYLü DQG KLV H[WUDGLWLRQ WR WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &ULPLQDO 7ULEXQDO IRU WKH IRUPHU
Yugoslavia in The Hague in 2001 sowed divisions at the institutional level and sparked 
a heated debate among Serbian public opinion. The controversy mostly pitted those 
supporting the decision against those claiming that the former head of state should be 
WULDOOHGLQ6HUELDZLWKQDWLRQDOLVWJURXSVFDOOLQJIRUJUDQWLQJ0LORãHYLüWRWDOLPPXQLW\
9ROWPHUDQG.UDHW]VFKPDU$PRUHSUDJPDWLFDSSURDFKVDZWKH0LORãHYLüWULDO
DV D QHFHVVDU\ UHFNRQLQJ PRPHQW WR OHDYH WKH SDVW EHKLQG DQG DGYDQFH 6HUELD¶V
membership application to the European Union (Dzihic and Wieser 2011; Jou 2010). 
 
The 2008 Election - The 2008 elections revolved around two emotionally charged 
topics: the unilateral declaration of Independence of Kosovo, and the EU integration 
process. The two issues were interwoven, as the first one was portrayed as the price 
to pay to muster international support, particularly by the US, for EU integration, akin 
WRWKHFRQIOLFWRYHU0LORãHYLü¶VH[WUDGLWLRQWRThe Hague. However, Serbian nationalists, 
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who continued to see Kosovo as a breakaway province of Serbia, re-cast the election 
as a struggle over national sovereignty. 
 
The Pride Parade of October 2010 - These themes emerged clearly during the public 
debate ahead and in the aftermath of the LGBT Pride Parade held in October 2010 in 
Belgrade and marred by the violent protests of right-wing nationalists (Voltmer and 
Kraetzschmar, 2015). The opposition to the Pride was multi-layered, and saw radical 
nationalists colluding with the Serbian Orthodox Church in portraying LGBT activists 
DV³SDUWRIDIRUHLJQDVVDXOWRQWKHQDWLRQ´(Gould and Moe 2015: 275). This narrative 
re-cast KRPRVH[XDOLW\DVSDUWRID³SURMHFWRIQDWLRQDOJHQRFLGH´DGYDQFHGE\:HVWHUQ
liberal democracies. As evidence of this foreign plot to undermine alleged Serbian 
traditional values, Serbian nationalists pointed at the support for the Parade expressed 
by Western diplomats. 
 
Ombudsman - The office of the Ombudsman was established with the mission to hold 
VWDWH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ ERGLHV WR DFFRXQW DQG 6DãD -DQNRYLü D SURVHFXWRU ZDV
DSSRLQWHG DW LWV KHOP $V µ3URWHFWRU RI WKH &LWL]HQV´ -DQNRYLü FDPH LQWR GLUHFW
confrontation with the government and its allies first in the aftermath of the 2014 LGBT 
Pride Parade, as the Ombudsman had to file criminal reports against two military police 
officers accompanying Andrej VXFLFWKH6HUELDQ3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶VEURWKHUDQG3UHGUDJ
Mali, the brother of the mayor of Belgrade. The fraught relation between the 
2PEXGVPDQDQGWKHVWDWHDSSDUDWXVIXUWKHUGHWHULRUDWHGLQDV-DQNRYLüVWDUWHG
to scrutinise the Military Security Agency and the tight connections between its top 
RIILFHUV DQG WKH JRYHUQPHQW $V D UHVXOW -DQNRYLü EHFDPH WKH REMHFW RI D smear 
campaign orchestrated by two media outlets, Informer and Pink, both linked to the 
UXOLQJ SDUW\ ZKLFK GHYRWHG KHDGOLQHV WR WKH VXLFLGH RI D IULHQG RI -DQNRYLü which 
KDSSHQHGDGHFDGHHDUOLHUGLVVHPLQDWLQJ LQQXHQGRVWKDW WKHVDPH-DQNRYLüPLJKW
have had a role in the death of his friend. The campaign, launched to delegitimise 
-DQNRYLüDQGWKURXJKKLPWKHYHU\RIILFHRIWKH2PEXGVPDQSRODULVHGWKH6HUELDQ
public opinion and brought to the fore, at the same time, the resistance of the 
government to any foUPRIDFFRXQWDELOLW\RQWKHRQHKDQGDQGWKHµZHDSRQL]DWLRQ¶RI
the media to screen state and security apparatuses ± both staffed by officers from the 
0LORãHYLü era ± from scrutiny. 
 
5 
 
1.2. Kenya 
 
Looking at it topically, the conflicts investigated in Kenya appear to be revolving around 
distinct issues: post-electoral violence in one case and minority targeting in the other. 
The former refers to the unrest that marred the aftermath of the 2007 political elections, 
which prompted the International Criminal Court to launch an investigation into the 
responsibilities of high-profile political figures (including President Uhuru Kenyatta) for 
stoking the violence, and raised the tension ahead of the 2013 elections, which 
eventually unfolded peacefully; the latter is centred on the security crackdown ordered 
by the Kenyan authorities on alleged sympathisers of the Somali-based militant group 
Al Shabab, and targeting, in particular, the large Somali community in the country, 
encompassing both Kenyan citizens of Somali origin and Somali refugees. However, 
as it will be discussed later, several interviewees established a link between the cases 
under examination, suggesting a vested interest of the Kenyan authorities in 
HPEUDFLQJµ:DURQ7HUURU¶UKHWRULFDQGSROLFLHVWRGLvert international scrutiny from the 
political responsibilities of the post-electoral violence. The picture emerging from the 
analysis of the 2007/2013 elections, of the ICC investigation into the alleged role of 
President Uhuru Kenyatta and of the Somali security crackdown thus stands against a 
common background tracing back to Independence and shaped by unresolved 
governance challenges between the central and the local administrations (Hope, 
2014); entrenched inequalities due to pervasive forms of state capture (Bedasso, 
2015); and disputes around citizenship and national identity at the core of the Kenyan 
state-building process and reflecting the fraught relationship between the Kenyan state 
and, at the same time, its Somali population and its most troublesome regional 
neighbour, Somalia (Chau, 2010; Lochery, 2012; Burbidge, 2015).  
 
Election conflict 2007/2008 - Several studies have highlighted the multi-layered 
nature of the political violence that engulfed Kenya in the aftermath of the 2007 
elections, causing the death of over 1,400 people and the displacement of hundreds 
of thousands (ICG, 2008). In the weeks following the proclamation of the incumbent 
president Mwai Kibaki over the rival Raila Odinga, suspicions of electoral fraud acted 
as a catalyst for the eruption of hostilities deeply entrenched in the post-colonial order 
and based on the unequal distribution of resources across ethnic and geographic lines 
(Republic of Kenya, 2008). Media, particularly vernacular radios, have been widely 
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KHOG UHVSRQVLEOH IRU µIXHOOLQJ WKH IODPHV¶ 2VERUQ$EGLDQG'HDQHE\
spreading inflammatory rumours. However, the proliferation of militias, the weakening 
of local institutions by a centralised executive dominated by the presidency and a 
winner-take-all attitude ingrained in political parties driven by ethnic clientelism 
(Mueller, 2015), are all factors pointing at leadership failures in some cases and at the 
F\QLFDOXVHRIYLROHQFHWROHYHUDJHRQH¶VSROLWLFDOLQIOXHQFHDWWhe negotiation table in 
others. 
 
The 2013 Elections - The memory of the unrests loomed over the country as it went 
back to the ballots in 2013. Despite renewed fears of vote rigging, international 
pressure to ensure the peaceful unfolding of the elections pushed Kenyan leaders to 
take a clear stance on political violence. At the same time, media outlets played a very 
different role than the preYLRXVWLPHHPEUDFLQJDµSHDFHQDUUDWLYH¶WKDWZKLOHKDLOLQJ
democratic values and championing national unity, toned down the debate on 
contentious topics, but often at the expense of free speech. (Cheeseman et al. 2014). 
As a result, key issues that had sparked violence in 2007 and in other elections 
beforehand have remained unsolved, leaving open the possibility of future violence 
(Halakhe, 2013: 6). 
 
The Kenyatta ICC Trial 2014 - Another fallout of the 2007 elections that played a role 
in 2013 was the investigation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) into the 
responsibilities for stoking the post-election violence. Although it is hard to tell whether 
the investigation acted as a deterrent for fresh unrests, the topic polarised public 
opinion, being seen through the lens of national politics rather than international justice 
as the ICC put under scrutiny a number of high profile politicians, including the front-
runner candidate Uhuru Kenyatta and his running mate William Ruto. Political and 
media criticisms to the ICC investigation and to the Kenyan organisations that backed 
it escalated during the campaign. After the victory of Kenyatta and Ruto, most 
politicians and media outlets withdrew their support to the prosecutors, who also 
blamed Kenyan authorities for their lack of collaboration and for the intimidation and 
bribing of witnesses (Gustaffson, 2016). 
 
Somali conflict - The history of the Somali community in Kenya is one of state 
violence, political marginalisation and recent economic success. Mostly concentrated 
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in the North Eastern Province (NEP), Somalis have seen their irredentist aspirations 
and their insurgency to become part of Somalia crushed by the Kenyan state in the 
aftermath of Independence. The inflows of refugees from Somalia after the collapse of 
the Somali state in 1991 created a humanitarian economy in Kenya that ended up 
benefitting also Somali Kenyans, as illustrated by the rise of business hubs such as 
WKHRQHLQWKH1DLUREL¶VQHLJKERXUKRRGRI(DVWOHLJK$OVRWKHDUULYDORIKXndreds of 
thousands of refugees brought to the fore the multifaceted reality of the Somali 
community, in which both clan and class dynamics shape group identities. 
 
The ICC investigation unfolded against a background characterised by the threats of 
terror attacks. The rise of al-Shabaab in Somalia had an impact on the popular 
perception of Somalis in Kenya. Increasing insecurity in the borderlands and in the 
humanitarian facilities foreshadowed the risk of a spill-over of the Somali conflict into 
Kenya. In October 2011, the Kenyan government launched Operation Linda Nchi 
(Protect the Country), officially to strike al-Shabaab strongholds in southern Somalia 
and prevent terrorist infiltrations. Instead, the operation achieved the opposite, 
triggering a spike in terror attacks claimed by al-Shabaab in the Kenya-Somalia 
borderland areas and in Nairobi, and fuelling suspicions of the Somali refugee 
population, particularly in urban centres. Although the Somali community in Kenya has 
suffered harassment from security forces since Independence, the period following the 
launch of the Operation Linda Nchi saw a spike in the number of reported abuses (Teff 
and Yarnell, 2013). Over the next two years, major terror attacks (particularly the raid 
of the upscale Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi) fuelled ethnic profiling of the Somali 
population (HRW, 2014). Stoking pre-existing communal tensions, particularly in the 
coastal region, the security crackdown escalated between March and April 2014 when 
the government launched the Operation Usalama Watch (Peace Watch). Over 4,000 
people were arrested in the course of a massive security swoop across Kenya, 
punctuated by gross violations of human rights and eventually ineffective to curb the 
violence, as was illustrated by large-scale attacks staged, allegedly by Al Shabaab, in 
the NEP. 
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1.3. South Africa 
 
Following the end of white minority rule and the first democratic elections held in April 
1994, South Africa witnessed a period of profound changes at both social and political 
levels. As the main force behind the anti-Apartheid struggle and the party of the icon 
of democracy and national reconciliation, Nelson Mandela and the African National 
Congress (ANC) catalysed popular hopes and expectations, claiming the role of the 
main architect of the New South Africa and, as such, winning the support of the voters 
at the ballot box. Political and media actors contributed to forging narratives of social 
justice to bridge racial divides and class inequalities. Significant rates of economic 
growth during the 1990s and early 2000s underpinned the aspirations of a 
marginalised population, who saw in the end of political disenfranchisement also an 
opportunity for economic empowerment. However, these expectations were 
increasingly betrayed by widespread corruption, state capture and growing 
inequalities. The emergence of a black elite stood in contrast with the dire conditions 
LQZKLFKODUJHVZDWKHVRIWKHSRSXODWLRQFRQWLQXHGWROLYHERWKLQWKHFLWLHV¶WRZQVKLSV
and rural areas (Bond, 2011). As the national economy started losing momentum in 
2008, the rise of Jacob Zuma to the presidency further undermined the moral authority 
of the ANC and accelerated the fragmentation of the South African society. Social 
conflicts were exacerbated by a crisis of political representation, with the partial 
H[FHSWLRQ RI ZRUNHUV¶ XQLRQV DQG FRPPXQLW\ OHDGHUV $V DQJHU DQG IUXVWUDWLRQ
mounted among the poorest segments of the population, protests against local 
administrations and the scapegoating of foreign workers intensified. 
 
Community protests - 3RSXODUSURWHVWVDQGZRUNHUV¶VWUXJJOHVKDYHQRWRQO\EHHQ
instrumental to the end of Apartheid, but have also actively shaped South African 
politics after 1994, as the ANC governments, under the pressure of international 
donors, increasing steered the country towards neo-liberal policies (Alexander 2010; 
Ballard et al. 2005; Pithouse 2008). As argued by Alexander and Pfaffe (2013), South 
$IULFD¶VORFDOPRELOLVDWLRQV± RULQWKHLUZRUGVµUHEHOOLRQVRIWKHSRRU¶± largely relied 
RQ WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQDO VNLOOV RI H[SHULHQFHG XQLRQV¶ FDGUHV ZKR KHOSHG GLUHFW
grassroots actions towards the demand of service delivery. This kind of protest, which 
intensified from 2005 onwards, addressed material needs such as water, electricity 
and housing but underscored deeper anxieties related to social and political exclusion.  
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Xenophobia - Similar anxieties were compounded by a deteriorating economic 
situation and created the breeding ground for a wave of xenophobic violence. Attacks 
against foreign workers and entrepreneurs and their property increased in number 
since 2000 onward and reached a peak in 2008 and 2015. 
 
The 2015 State of the Nation Address - As the government became enmeshed in 
multiple corruption scandals, new political subjects, such as the Economic Freedom 
Fighters (EFF) led by Julius Malema, emerged to challenge the dominant position of 
the ANC. In particular, the EFF seized the opportunity offered by the outrage over the 
DOOHJHGGLYHUVLRQRIVWDWHIXQGVWRSD\IRU-DFRE=XPD¶VSULYDWHUHVLGHQFH%HUHVIRUG
2015) and disrupted the 2015 State of the Nation address (SONA), urging the 
3UHVLGHQWWRµSD\EDFN WKHPRQH\¶9ROWPHUDQG.UDHW]VFKPDUD 
 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1. Description of sample 
 
The sample of the interviewees included government officials and political and 
community leaders involved in the conflicts under study. Some leaders perceived 
themselves as activists and, in several cases, political authorities made it clear that 
they were speaking without consent from their organisation. The interviews were 
conducted face-to-face and, when possible, they were audio-recorded. 
 
The dataset (of Work Package 6 in the original project design) consists of material 
collected in 51 interviews which were conducted in the four countries: 10 interviews in 
Egypt2, 22 interviews in Kenya, 19 interviews in Serbia and 16 interviews in South 
Africa (see detailed lists in Appendix 1). In total, the sample builds on 46 hours and 09 
minutes of interview conversation (11h and 03 minutes in Egypt, 11 hours and 15 
minutes in Kenya, 15 hours and 30 minutes in Serbia and 8 hours and 21 minutes in 
South Africa). 
 
                                                          
2
 At the moment of writing, the interviews conducted by the Egyptian research team had not been 
translated and coded yet. 
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The interviewed government authorities and political and community leaders were 
selected according to their involvement in the conflicts in each of the three countries. 
Although leaders may play a critical role both in fuelling and mitigating tensions in 
conflicts, for obvious reasons all interviewees emphasised their commitment to 
democratic values. 
 
The interviewees were asked to describe their communication strategies through which 
they got their messages across, the narratives they embraced and the values 
underpinning their political views. They were also asked to reflect on their relationship 
with the media and on their capacity to identify stresses and potential for violence, 
including through µlistening¶ to citizens. The interviewees were selected according to 
the overall sampling strategy that was agreed upon by the MeCoDEM consortium and 
indicated in the research plan. There was a rigorous discussion about whether to 
include only formal or also informal leaders and, based on the specific features of the 
fields of investigation, we decided on a combined approach. Although the initial focus 
was on government authorities, we realised that, in order to understand top-down 
volatile communication contexts, we needed to consider leaders both de jure and de 
facto, and, therefore, we included in our sample also community and religious leaders. 
 
2.2. Techniques of data collection and data analysis 
 
The research was based on qualitative, semi-structured interviews in order to explore 
DQ LQWHUYLHZHH¶V SRLQW RI YLHZ LQ detail. Qualitative interviews were based on an 
interview guide to ensure that all topics are covered, but makes allowance for probing 
topics that had not been anticipated or need further questioning. The interview guide 
starts with a basic checklist of information that could be analysed to get an overview of 
the demographics of participants, their position within organisations, etc. All 
interviewees completed a questionnaire to provide key demographic data in order to 
collect a general picture of the interYLHZHHV¶SHUVRQDODQGSURIHVVLRQDOEDFNJURXQGV
'DWDZDVDOVRFROOHFWHGRQLQWHUYLHZHHV¶SHUVRQDOLQYROYHPHQWLQHDFKFRQIOLFWFDVH
the structure of their organisation and strategies for mobilisation, internal and external 
communication, relationship with and views of mainstream media, and values and 
objectives. 
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The interviews were preceded by a reconstruction of the selected democratisation 
FRQIOLFW LQ RUGHU WR FODULI\ WKH LQWHUYLHZHH¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ WKH FRQIOLFWV 7KH
reconstruction was in most cases helped by articles and photos to trigger the 
LQWHUYLHZHHV¶µretrospective introspection¶. 
 
2.3. Data analysis and ethics  
 
The data collection was carried out according to the ethical standards defined by the 
MeCoDEM guidelines. Interviewees were given the option to remain anonymous and 
data was encrypted. The interview guide explained the aim of each question. Research 
documents were accurately translated into local languages where required. The 
research instruments were all tested in four pilot interviews, one conducted in each 
country. Amendments to phrasing and sequence of questions were made based on 
the findings of the pilot interviews. Each country team entered their data in an NVivo 
coding template. An integrated dataset was then developed incorporating data from 
three countries. 
 
2.4. Data management 
 
Interviews were recorded, transcribed and (in the case of Serbia and Egypt) translated 
into English. In order to ensure consistency for transcription and translation across 
countries, we used the transcription and translation manual that was developed during 
earlier stages in the project. All material relevant to the interviews was uploaded to the 
relevant space on the University of Leeds N:drive server space, and stored here in line 
ZLWK0H&R'(0¶VHWKLFDOJXLGHOLQHVRQGDWDsecurity. The material includes: Interview 
transcripts (both the originals and English versions); Scanned questionnaires; The 
reconstruction material which was used in the course of the interviews based on the 
reconstructive approach: Audio files of interviews; Signed consent forms; documents 
related to the organisations of the political authority, such as annual reports, 
pamphlets, placards, etc. 
 
2.5. Description of the NVivo dataset 
 
In order to build a consistent and structured integrated dataset, which can be used for 
analysis, NVivo software was used in line with the procedure followed during earlier 
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stages (WP5). The country teams prepared single NVivo datasets for their respective 
country based on a template and additional instructions provided by the University of 
Oxford team. After the single datasets were finalised by the country teams, they were 
compiled into one integrated dataset by the University of Oxford team. Both single 
datasets and the integrated dataset have been uploaded to the N:drive. 
 
The NVivo dataset (a) includes all material relevant for the analysis of the interviews. 
Thus, anonymised interview transcripts, as well as questionnaires and reconstruction, 
have been imported as sources into the NVivo project. To ensure consistency within 
the data, the documents have been named according to the following scheme: 
WP6_Country_Interview[number]_Transcript/Reconstruction/Questionnaire 
 
Moreover, the dataset (b) provides structured data, organised around certain criteria: 
Specifically, the material has been organised dependent on which participant they 
belong to. In addition, given the MeCoDEM case study approach and the research 
focus, the material has been organised dependent on the conflict cases it refers to as 
well as on the topics that are raised in the interview. Thus, the NVivo dataset already 
included the first step of coding and serves as an important basis for the in-depth 
analysis of data later on. 
 
3. Findings 
 
3.1. Framing the past 
 
As Voltmer and Kraetzschmar (2015) remind us, µdemocratisation conflicts are not only 
about the IXWXUH EXW DOVR DERXW WKH SDVW¶ [11]. Interpretations of historical events, 
related to the transition from the previous regime to democracy and to the foundation 
of the local political institutions, reverberate not only on conflicting agendas, but also 
on the visions of the place that the country should occupy in the world and of its future 
trajectories. Communicative practices are thus crucial to craft and propagate narratives 
of the past that legitimate present discourses and political strategies and enable 
citizens to make sense of the struggles that the conflicting parties are waging. It is 
significant that reflections on the past, and on its importance to understanding current 
events, are dominant in the interviews to political authorities in Serbia, where the 
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aftermaths of the Balkan wars in the 1990s and the traumatic events that led and 
followed the ousting of 0LORãHYLü are still a controversial and very divisive issue.  
 
The past is at the centre of contested interpretations that define political identities and 
drive collective action. Take, for example, the extradition of 0LORãHYLü to the 
International Criminal Court in The Hague. There is large consensus on the fact that 
the decision was the only way to put the past behind ± or to µclear up the political scene¶ 
[16], acknowledging the political significance of the trial and even drawing analogies 
with the Nuremberg trial [16]. It was a reckoning moment, which symbolised a cut with 
the past in the eyes of both Serbians and the international community. An interviewee 
recalled the event, which polarised national public opinion, in almost metaphysical 
WHUPV DV D GHFLVLRQ WR µWDPH¶ WKH GRPHVWLF IRUFHV WKDW DFWHG DJDLQVW µus¶ [16] ± 
referring, with the term µIRUFHV¶WRWKHDJJUHVVLYHQDWLRQDOLVPVSDZQHGE\WKHUHJLPH¶V
incendiary rhetoric, consolidated during the Balkan wars and aggrieved after NATO 
VWRSSHG6HUELD¶VFDPSDLJQLQ.RVRYR2QWKHFRQWUDU\ZKHQVSHDNLQJDERXWWKH,&&
case against 0LORãHYLü, radical and nationalist leaders embraced conspiracy theories 
according to which the Democratic Opposition of Serbia was a product of those 
intelligence services µthat dismantled ex-<XJRVODYLD¶ [4] and µthe west financed and 
insisted on that revolution that RYHUWKUHZ 0LORãHYLü LQ 2FWREHU¶ [7] ± what Serbian 
QDWLRQDOLVWV FDOO µthe Fifth of October coup¶, while pro-GHPRFUDF\ DFWLYLVWV FDOO µWKH
2FWREHU5HYROXWLRQ¶. 
 
The past is also a prism through which to look at contemporary events and future 
challenges and the place where an injustice is rooted and suffered by the community, 
either national or ethnic, and whose repercussions are still felt today. This is the case, 
for instance, for the conflict erupted in the aftermath of the 2007 Kenyan political 
elections. The interviewees generally agreed on the fact that the alleged rigging of the 
2007 elections was the kindling that sparked deep-seated tensions. Grievances tracing 
back to Independence were mentioned as the underlying cause and the post-election 
violence related to large unequal allocation of resources, starting with land. Indeed, the 
epicentre of the post-election violence was the Rift Valley, the most fertile area of the 
FRXQWU\ )ROORZLQJ ,QGHSHQGHQFH LQ  .HQ\D¶V ILUVW 3UHVLGHQW -RPR .HQ\DWWD
favoured his tribe, the Kikuyu, to repossess the land previously owned by British 
colonialists at the expense of other ethnic communities [9]. Although elite pacts 
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encompassing leaders of different tribes have characterised Kenyan post-colonial 
history (Bedasso, 2015), Kenyan political parties have maintained a clear ethnic 
connotation, with the ruling Party of National Unity (PNU) associated to Kikuyus and 
the main opposition party Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) associated ZLWK/XR¶V. 
Thus, there is a widespread awareness, among the interviewees, that tribal 
identification largely shapes political affiliation. This acknowledgement is generally 
underpinned by two complementing ideas: on the one hand, that the identification with 
specific ethnic communities is strengthened by the sharing of similar grievances, on 
the other, that political leaders, to a different extent, mobilise tribal identities during 
elections. The elections were thus seen as an opportunity to challenge entrenched 
relations of power and reverse the status quo, claiming back µHaki yetu, Haki Yetu - 
Our right our right¶, as outraged citizens chanted in the streets of Nairobi after the 
incumbent president Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, was announced as winner amidst fraud 
allegations [11]. 
 
The legacy of the past, with its unresolved issues, also looms over the South African 
cases. As in the Serbian and the Kenyan case, the conflicts here examined were 
largely seen as triggered by the contingent event but reveal pre-existing tensions 
fuelled by inequality and marginalisation. This was particularly evident in the case of 
service delivery protests, multi-layered and multifaceted conflicts driven either by 
JUDVVURRWVPRYHPHQWV¶FODLPVWRULJKWVVXFKDVODQGRUVHUYLFHVRUE\ORFDOOHDGHUV
vying for dominant positions in communities. The boundaries between these two forms 
of protest are blurred, but both build upon an underlying anger against a wider 
economic conjuncture [7]. As an interviewee put it: 
 
,W LVQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\ WKH\KDYHDSUREOHPZLWKDEor c. they're angry about the 
general situation... And they articulate their anger at the broader socio-economic 
position through a protest march on the specific issue. [7] 
 
At the origin of the anger, interviewees recognised multiple causes related to 
unresolved issues from the Apartheid era. Some leaders attributed this frustration to 
the gradual deterioration of the relationship between the ANC and its constituency, 
leading to periodic flare-ups of violence. Service conflicts intensified during local 
government elections as they merged with strikes organised by civil servant unions. 
Municipal workers leveraged µthe sensitivity around the elections and the fact that the 
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ruling party wanted peace and calm during the election process¶ to get their demands 
met by the government. In that case, the ANC was simultaneously the employer and a 
target of broader grievances, which have been exacerbated since 2008. The service 
delivery protests expressed a brewing anger against the inability of the ANC to bringing 
development because of gatekeeper politics (Beresford, 2015), thus betraying the 
legacy of the anti-Apartheid struggle. 
 
3.2. µUs¶ vs µthe west¶ 
 
Another theme recurring throughout the interviews and shaping the narratives of the 
opposing parties is the position of the country vis-à-viVWKHUHVWRIWKHZRUOGRIWHQµWKH
ZHVW¶. The conflicts under examination reveal an underlying tension between openness 
and closure, or, to say it better, between a positive and a zero-sum game view of 
international relations. In Serbia, the possibility of EU integration was interpreted by 
some as a step forward to leave the past behind, while, for others, was paramount of 
relinquishing national sovereignty. While for democracy activists the extradition of 
0LORãHYLü to The Hague and the Independence of Kosovo were the price to pay to 
introduce a new Serbia to the rest of the world, meaning particularly the EU and US, 
nationalist politicians did not hide their mistrust of Western interference, regarding the 
whole democratisation process as a decoy to further emasculate Serbia. As a 
nationalist politician suggested: 
 
I think that democracy is just a cover for some other interests, and the interest I 
am talking about is the interest of conquering foreign lands. Slobodan warned of 
this. We are currently in the process of being conquered. [4] 
 
7KLV µVLHJHPHQWDOLW\¶ LVDVWDSOH IL[WXUHRI ULJKW-wing movements (Holbrooke, 2013; 
âUDPDQG'XOLüDQGLVGLUHFWO\OLQNHGWRWKHSDUDQRLDGHULYHGE\WKHSHUFHLYHG
threat to the national integrity. Kosovo was thus framed as a battle for the soul of 
Serbia, as, in the word of a right-wing politician, Kosovo is µthe heart of Serbia¶ and the 
µcradle of Serbian civilisation¶ [6]. This anxiety was largely kept at bay by the prospect 
of EU annexation, at least until 2008, when the process of reckoning with the past was 
increasingly portrayed in public discourses as a wound to national pride, a violence 
imposed from the outside with no benefits in return as the EU continued to drag its feet 
over the integration process. Nationalist politicians saw the arrest and the extradition 
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of 0LORãHYLü and the unilateral declaration of Independence of Kosovo as a way to 
appease the international community and as another example of violated national 
sovereignty, carried out against the law [14]. This was done despite deep 
disagreements within the government. In 2008, the general frustration due to the 
impending economic crisis was compounded by widespread disillusionment because 
of the lack of progress in EU integration [17]. The 2008 elections were framed as a 
FRQIOLFWWRSURWHFW6HUELD¶VQDWLRQDOVRYHUHLJQW\DJDLQVW:HVWHUQLQIOXHQFH>@$V one 
right-wing politician said: 
 
those parties are nothing more but political puppets of the west, and they 
understand the political struggle and the act of ruling only as a means of serving 
the interests of the European Union and as a means of fulfilling the goals of the 
European Union, or the United States. [6] 
 
µ5HVSHFW¶LVDUHFXUUHQWWHUPLQWKHLQWHUYLHZVwith radical politicians, and the evidence 
of the lack of respect of foreign power towards Serbia is seen in both the alleged 
attempts to disLQWHJUDWH6HUELDE\GHFUHDVLQJµthe size of Serbian territory to the size 
of Belgrade and the surrounding region¶ [6], and in anecdotes such as the one 
according to which an AmerLFDQ DPEDVVDGRU ZRXOG µvisit the Serbian Government 
dressed in his tennis clothes and in his shorts, as if he is the boss who owns the place¶
[6]. Being supported by Western diplomats, the LGBT Parade epitomised, in the eyes 
of the µFirst Serbia¶, a further blow to Serbian political sovereignty and cultural identity. 
Although right-wing politicians were accused of advancing an 'isolationist' agenda that 
would take the country back to the Nineties [5], the issue was really about which 
international community each party was referring to. In fact, Russia, with its Slavic 
cultural roots and its restrictive laws against the µpublic display¶ of homosexuality, was 
seen as a natural point of reference by those who saw LGBT rights as at odds with the 
imagined Serbian identity [15]. Also, the Ombudsman was framed by nationalists and 
pro-government media outlets as the imposition of institutions and values foreign to 
the Serbian political system and culture [2]. An interviewee, for instance, recalls how: 
 
during one public debate one editor-in-chief of a pro-regime media outlet 
exhausted herself trying to explain to me how we imported the Ombudsman as 
an institution from Scandinavia, and she claimed that this was some fancy 
PRGHUQWKLQJWKDWZHGLGQ¶WQHHGµWh\ZRXOGZHKDYHWRORRNXSWRVRPH,GRQ¶W
know, Scandinavians? I mean, why should they be so important that we have to 
look up to them?¶[10] 
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The case of Kenya is different ± historically a strategic ally of the West and a major 
recipient of official development aid foreign direct investments in East Africa. The 2007-
2008 post-HOHFWLRQYLROHQFHPDUUHG.HQ\D¶VUHSXWDWLRQDPRQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOSDUWQHUV
as a beacon of political stability, however misplaced this assumption was. In 2007, the 
presence of international election observers did not prevent the riots from happening. 
As Cheeseman et al. (2014) suggest, by questioning the election results, the EU 
observers induced the defeated candidate Raila Odinga to think that he would have 
international support if he led, or however subtly encouraged, the protest of his 
followers ± it was a path with disastrous consequences. In 2013, international donors 
made plain their concern about a repeat of violence, thus adding pressure on political 
actors to guarantee a peaceful election. A widely-held opinion among the interviewees 
was that the ICC investigation into the responsibilities for the previous election 
violence, and associated perceptions of international interference, contributed to 
forging the alliance between two leading political figures, Uhuru Kenyatta and William 
Ruto, thus defusing the risk of conflict between their respective ethnic communities 
(Kikuyu and Kalenjin). The attitude towards international partners emerging from the 
interviews does not reveal any specific polemical overtone but is surprisingly 
constrained given public statements about western interference and western NGOs 
often made by politicians. Interestingly, when discussing the security crackdown on the 
Somali refugee population in Kenya, some interviewees argued that Kenya had 
already proven a commitment to its humanitarian duties and now it was time for the 
foreign countries to take their fair share of the burden. There was an urging for greater 
western involvement, perhaps reflecting strong benefits (including financial as well as 
a willingness to tamper criticism of domestic issues such as human rights) of security 
partnerships with the US, UK and EU, that the Kenyan government received. As a 
government officer explained: 
 
What we have done by announcing the process and going to media and interview 
LVWKDWZHKDYHSXWWKHSOLJKWRIWKH6RPDOLUHIXJHHVLQIURQWRIWKHZRUOG«7KLV
is a big problem that requires the entire world to work together in repatriating the 
6RPDOLV«ZHDUHKDSS\WKDWWKHZRUOGKDVZRNHQXSWRWKHSOLJKWRIWKH6RPDOL
refugees. It would not be good to let them continue staying there after 25 years 
in deplorable conditions if there is a better alternative which is resettling them in 
their own country. There they can start building permanent structures and not 
living in tents. [20] 
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Surprisingly, some of the South African interviewees also appeared to echo some of 
the concerns of Serbian nationalists, wondering whether the democratic model 
championed by Western representative democracies was also a viable example for 
the South African context. This argument expresses the scepticism against universal 
definitions of democracy, sXJJHVWLQJLQVWHDGWKDWµ:HVWHUQ-VW\OHGHPRFUDF\¶VKRXOGEH
µ$IULFDQLVHG¶%XWZKLOHIURP6HUELDQLQWHUYLHZVWKLVPLVWUXVWDSSHDUVGLUHFWO\OLQNHGWR
WKHVLHJHSDUDQRLDWKDWSRUWUD\VGHPRFUDF\DVDµ7URMDQKRUVH¶WRIXUWKHUHURGH6HUELDQ
national sovereignty, South African interviewees emphasise the importance of cultural 
norms that should be taken into account and integrated within democratic institutions. 
As an ANC communication officer pointed out: 
  
'HPRFUDF\LWVHOILV«QRWDQ$IULFDQFRQFHSW'HPRFUDcy obviously has to be 
Africanised. It has to be integrated into the African cultural systems. For instance, 
when we say we have overhauled the rules for the first time since 1994 we are 
talking of moving away from Westminster style type of parliament and to a truly 
South African/African parliament.  
 
This argument is particularly effective to legitimise patron-client relations and the claim 
that leaders should be exempted from scrutiny. This topic will be discussed further 
below. However, it is worth noting that at the centre of criticism there are particularly 
Western notions of separation of powers and mechanisms of check and balance, 
LGHDOO\WRVWHPDXWKRULWDULDQWHQGHQFLHVWKDWVKRXOGEHDGDSWHGWRµ$IULFDQ¶QRUPVRI
respect [13], according to which: 
 
\RXGRQ¶WFDOODQHOGHUO\SHUVRQZLWKKLVRUKHUILUVWQDPHLWGRHVQ¶WPDWWHUWKH
disagreement that you have. But in our setup here in South Africa, you will find a 
\RXQJER\FDOOLQJHYHQWKHSUHVLGHQWRIWKLVFRXQWU\E\KLVILUVWQDPH,GRQ¶WDJUHH
with =XPD,GRQ¶WOLNHKLVHWKLFVEXWZHDUHQRWDWWKHVDPHDJHDQG,FDQVWLOO
pursue my position effectively without belittling him. 
 
These debates are occurring in the context of widespread and significant student 
SURWHVWVLQFOXGLQJFDOOVIRUµGHFRORQL]LQJ¶XQLYHUVLWLHVWUDQVIRUPLQJFXUULFXODDZD\IURP
more western-centric literature towards more African rooted scholarship. There are 
also increasing pressures on the executive, with calls for President Jacob Zuma to 
resign over corruption allegations and abuse of power.  
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3.3. Values and ideologies 
 
As suggested above, narratives are underpinned by a complex interweaving of 
systems of values and vested interests. In particular, the thread running through the 
interviews in all the cases under examination is the tension between inward and 
outward tendencies. In Serbia, this clash of values was particularly evident in the case 
of the LGBT 3ULGHVHHQE\PDQ\DVDSRZHUIXOZDWHUVKHGEHWZHHQ³WZR6HUELDV´RU
what is also called The First Serbia and The Second Serbia. The former is, as one 
interviewee describedµWKHRQHWKDWVXSSRUWHG6ORERGDQ0LORãHYLüDQG9RMLVODYâHãHOM
and which is against the EU and the West and so on, and which was the majority in 
WKH QLQHWLHV¶, while the latter is identified by the support to the accession to the 
European Union µand some Western values, democracy and so on¶ [15]. 
 
The LGBT parade was seen as aQDUHQDLQZKLFKWZRJURXSVRI µexternal influence 
clashed... we had a group of states which supported one side, and on the other hand 
a group of states which supported the other side. So, the influence of the international 
comPXQLW\ZDVQDWXUDOO\WKHUH¶ [15]. The reference here was to the values embodied 
by the EU and the West in general and those championed by an ideal Slavic and 
Orthodox community whose leading proponent was Russia, a country with a poor 
record when it comes to LGBT rights. This contributed to defining the positions in terms 
of Pro-European and anti-European [3]. Some identified themselves as anti-globalist, 
rejecting the idea of Serbia joining the European Union, but advocating an equal footing 
with other European countries [6]. Another right wing politician related the protest of 
LGBT Pride to a broader battle against a degradation of traditional values perceived 
as spreading on a global scale. The opposition to the LGBT Pride was thus seen as 
just another front in a broader battle against a world in which µeverything is soft, wavy 
and fluid, even borders and human and minority rights. Everything can be brought into 
question and there are no UXOHVWKDWZHVWULFWO\DELGHE\¶ [3]. The same interviewee, 
though, identified a precise political strategy behind this cultural battle on a global 
VFDOHDUJXLQJWKDWµbehind all of this, the United States is pulling the strings¶[3]. The 
opposition to the LGBT Pride reflected a deeper rejection of µthe devastating effects of 
the so-called transition that began in the year 2000¶ [6], and, more broadly, of µvalues 
to Serbia that are not entirely acceptable in the context of our society¶ EURXJKW E\
µglobalism and the EU integration process¶ [18]. 
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While Serbian nationalism emerges from the interviews as a response to a momentous 
transformation that is seen as, at the same time, jeopardising a system of values 
ingrained in an imagined collective identity and humiliating national sovereignty, in 
Kenya the situation is different. Identity politics based on tribe, is unanimously rebuked 
as a backwards relic undermining Kenyan democracy, national unity and peaceful 
coexistence. Although tribes are recognised as the bricks of Kenyan national identity, 
and the loci in which forms of solidarity emerge and are cultivated, tribalism as an 
ideology is associated to neo-patrimonialism, in which political leaders tend to favour 
members of their own community in terms of public appointment, thus further 
marginalising other communities. While in 2007-2008 the state, the security forces and 
the civil society were found largely unprepared to respond to the escalation of violence 
and to craft a narrative to oppose the inflammatory rhetoric that pitted ethnic 
communities against one another (mostly Kikuyu and Kalenjin in the Rift Valley and 
Kikuyu and Luo in Nairobi), in 2013 a µpeace narrative¶ was mainstreamed to tune down 
WKH µ]HUR-VXPJDPH¶DWWLWXGH WKDWKDG W\SLFDOO\FKDUDFWHULVHGSUHYLRXVHOHFWLRQV%\
promoting a dialogue across ethnic lines, political and community leaders sought to 
advance a narrative that stressed the interconnectedness of the different communities, 
the message being that wanton violence and looting would affect Kenya as a whole 
[13]. A constellation of public authorities and organisation sought to counter tribalism 
with a narrative which emphasised national unity under the rule of the law. As a 
JRYHUQPHQW DXWKRULW\ VDLG µThe law is our Bible and we apply on individuals, not 
FRPPXQLWLHV¶ [6], while another pointed at the abidance to the law, and to constitutional 
norms, as a precondition for peace [13]. 
 
However, some pointed out that this emphasis on peace not only legitimised the status 
quo, but conflated political dissent with the risk of social unrest and, in so doing, 
silenced any in-depth debate on persisting inequalities (see also Cheeseman et al. 
2015). For some interviewees, mostly linked to opposition parties, this totalising peace 
discourse was seen as preventing the full implementation of the Constitution, with the 
result that structural issues were left to simmer under the surface (and likely to lead to 
fresh violence in the future). As the government takes on the role of guarantor of peace 
and stability, some interviewees expressed the concern that the country could drift 
towards authoritarianism or, in other words, that Kenya could go µthe Ugandan way¶ 
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after rumours spread that in the future the votes would be tallied in military barracks 
[13]. 
 
7KHSULPDF\RIWKHUXOHRIODZZDVDOVRXVHGWRMXVWLI\WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VGHFLVLRQWR
securitise the Somali refugee population, underlining that the policy was neither an 
ethnic nor a religious profiling in a country in which Somalis with Kenyan IDs and 
Muslims are a large segment of the population. In fact, when explaining the decision 
to scrutinise the Somali refugee population and close down the refugee camps (this 
decision is currently put on hold), government authorities dismissed nativist concerns 
and, instead, emphasised the values of responsibility and accountability, by focusing 
on the security concerns of some Kenyan citizens following a spate of terror attacks. 
Moreover, the announced closure of the humanitarian spaces and the repatriation of 
all refugees to Somalia was explained as a necessary provision to prevent the camps 
from becoming breeding grounds for terrorist activities, with benefits for international 
donors, despite the criticism of human rights advocacy organisations. As a government 
officer pointed out: 
 
we have made it clear that not all Somalis are terrorists and not all Muslims are 
terrorists, so this is not a blanket condemnation. The only reason why we are 
closing the camp is because it becomes a safe haven for these kinds of activities, 
we can only deal with that by closing these camps. [20] 
 
Similarly to Kenya, in South Africa, the rule of law is upheld as the principle around 
which opposing parties articulate their narratives, with reference to conflicts at both 
national and local level. Occupying private land can be seen as a political statement or 
as a criminal offence, according to the party in conflict. However, both sides framed 
their action as in conformity with the constitutional law. Pluralism and the right to protest 
are both enshrined in the Constitution, provided that one does not encroach on the 
other, so that if people want to protest, µWKDW¶V WKHLU ULJKW «DV ORQJDV WKH\GRQ¶W
prevent others from seeing the SONA and whatever¶[14]. Both the *RYHUQPHQW¶Vand 
SURWHVWHUV¶DFWLYLWLHVDUHORRNHGDWWKURXJKWKHSULVPRIWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOYDOXHVDQG
each party claims higher moral ground by emphasising its adherence to the legacy of 
the struggle against Apartheid. Since the Constitution is universally seen as the 
accomplishment of the struggle against minority rule, it stands for a promise of 
democracy that some see as partially fulfilled while others see as betrayed. 
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It is worth pointing out that ANC members regularly claim for their party not only the 
political legacy of the anti-Apartheid struggle, of which the Constitution is the bulwark, 
but also the values that inspired the struggle. Moreover, the ANC is seen as having 
proven throughout its history a long-term vision which, unlike for other parties, goes 
beyond a narrow political agenda. According to one of its members, the ANC: 
 
is driven by our historical mission or historical objective of liberating all Africa or 
all black people and Africans in particular. And the values of democracy of 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP « WKH $1& KLVWRULFDOO\ OHG RXU SHRSOH
V VWUXJJOH DJDLQVW
Apartheid and colonialism. It led to the creation of constitutional democracy. And 
what we are advancing is that which is consistent, the values are consistent with 
our Constitution. [11] 
 
The main tension recurring throughout the South African interviews was related to the 
relation between constitutional values derived from the democratisation process and 
the implementation of the law, seen by government officials as aligned and by protest 
movements as in contradiction with each other. A similar tension emerged when 
reflecting on the xenophobic violence. While condemning the violence, some 
government officers pointed at the high number illegal immigrants µbecause of that 
perception that our HFRQRP\LVDJUHDWZRUNKRUVHVRLW¶VDSODFHWRZRUN¶EXWµwe also 
had to message that deals with that if you are residing in South Africa, you have to 
abide by our laws. You know, firstly a lot of people who claim to be refugees are not¶ 
[15], However, other interviewees regard as a rupture with the notion of Ubuntu (a 
1JXQLWHUPVPHDQLQJµFRPSDVVLRQ¶DQGµKXPDQLW\¶DQGWKH5DLQERZ1DWLRQQDUUDWLYH
at the core of post-apartheid South Africa. As a community worker said: 
 
People need to understand that xenophobic attacks were not going to provide 
solutions to the problems of the country, that people need to understand that we 
can live together as a nation, we can live together as different nations in one 
country and all work together towards a common vision«,WKLQNRXUYDOXHV«
always revolve around the spirit of Ubuntu that we are all Africans. So that's what 
guides us and that we are all protected by the Constitution of the Republic of SA. 
[9] 
 
3.4. Leveraging grievances 
 
There is consensus across the different case studies on the fact that the conflicts under 
examination express broader dissatisfaction and that leaders emerge by intercepting 
discontent among segments of the population and leveraging grievances to mobilise 
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support around other issues, thus challenging the political status quo. So, in Serbia for 
instance, a party officer observed that the LGBT Pride Parade was µused as a place 
where that sort of political forces could be mobilised¶ to µundermine the authorities and 
actually prove that the government which was in power then, in 2009 and 2010, was 
QRWFDSDEOHRIRUJDQLVLQJD3ULGH3DUDGH«/*%7PHPEHUVZHUHQRWWKHUHDOWDUJHW
as the Democratic Party was the main target¶ [15]. In the words of right wing politicians, 
the protest against the LGBT parade was simultaneously an opportunity to lambaste 
the action of the government and a statement against the public display of 
homosexuality [18].  
 
Some interviewees also suggested that it is not leaders that make conflicts but are 
rather conflicts that make leaders. Reflecting on the political repercussions of the 
H[WUDGLWLRQ RI 6ORERGDQ 0LORãHYLü LQWHUYLHZHHV IURP DFURVV WKH SROLWLFDO VSHFWUXP
agreed on the fact that the post-0LORãHYLüHUDVDZWKH'HPRFUDWLF2SSRVLWLRQRI6HUELD
splitting over nationalism and on the future trajectory that Serbia should take and the 
former president was used as a political pawn around which an internal struggle of 
power was played out. A politician suggested that µ0LORãHYLü¶VH[WUDGLWLRQPDUNHGWKH
beginning of the conflict, nor did it mark its end¶ [14]. This specific issue was thus an 
opportunity that different leaders used to position themselves and appeal to different 
constituencies. On a similar note, but speaking about Kosovo, some interviewees 
suggested that leaders positioned themselves as nationalist or the other way around 
not out of conviction but rather to appease their constituencies. Supporting or opposing 
the Independence of Kosovo was seen by many as based on political calculations, as 
the case of Kostunica, first supporting and then opposing EU integration, clearly 
LOOXVWUDWHG6Rµboth sides in this conflict had something against each other and Kosovo 
was just a good excuse for them to fight¶ [5]. 
 
In Kenya, grievances were often framed in ethnic terms, despite the consolidated 
SUDFWLFHRIHOLWHSDFWVWKDW WKURXJKWKHFRXQWU\¶VSRVW-colonial history, guaranteed a 
certain degree of stability. Tribalism was therefore largely recognised as the discourse 
used, often cynically, by leaders to mobilise their supporters and increase their political 
weight while negotiating in private. The unequal distribution of resources was 
unanimously regarded as the root of the grievances, but the interviewees also 
suggested that politics in Kenya still revolves around the idea that elections continue 
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to be seen as an opportunity to tilt the balance, but without questioning the neo-
patrimonial logics that have produced and exacerbated inequality in the country [17]. 
The idea that vested interests are a powerful driver behind political agendas also 
emerged when considering the humanitarian arguments advanced by refugee 
advocacy organisations regarding the security crackdown of the Somali population. A 
government officer, for instance, claimed that: 
 
there are businesses that stand to lose millions of shillings and dollars if the 
camps are closed. For them it is not about the refugees but about their 
businesses. [20] 
 
The South African cases resonate similar arguments. Longstanding grievances and 
frustrations provided the fuel that was ignited by the failure of politics to address the 
broken promises of the post-Apartheid era. The SONA was expected to address this 
anger by focusing, according to an $1&FRPPXQLFDWLRQRIILFHURQµthe needs and the 
challenges of ordinary South Africans¶ clarifying µwhat is it there for me that is going to 
better my life? What is government going to do¶ [11]. Instead, its disruption brought 
even more to the fore the scale of the frustration, underlying the inability ± or 
unwillingness - of the ANC government to tackle the unequal access to resources and 
the widespread corruption, compounded by inefficiency in the state machinery, seen 
also as a major factor behind service delivery conflicts [17]. Xenophobic violence is 
VHHQDVDµcontestation around the resources in community areas where the locals will 
IHHOWKDWWKRVHWKDWDUHFRPLQJDVIRUHLJQHUV«WDNHDZD\WKHLUOLPLWHGUHVRXUFHV¶ [9]. 
Resources are the object of contention in situations of scarcity and cut-throat 
competition in which foreign nationals are accused of charging lower prices [1]. At the 
same time, leaders were accused of politicising xenophobic violence to divert the 
attention from the root causes of the inequality [9]. Opposition leaders put the blame 
on the ruling party for closing a blind eye the scapegoating of foreign shop-owners and 
workers as an opportunity to steer the rising popular anger away from the ANC: 
 
The ruling party [s] they obviously needed to be seen to sort of be alleviating the 
violence but they were very much trying to sort of shift the blame from the social 
LVVXHV WKDW WKH\ KDGQ¶W DGGUHVVHG«WKH SUREOHP ZDV WKDW WKHUH ZDV D ORW RI
IUXVWUDWLRQDQGDORWRIWHQVLRQDURXQGWKHVRFLDOLVVXHVWKDWKDGQ¶WEHHQUHFWLILHG
and the slow pace of change and there was almost like a look for a sort of scape 
JRDW$QG,WKLQNMXVWWKHIDFWWKDW>V@WKLVZKROHµXVYVWKHP¶DQGLWZDVREYLRXVO\
quite easy to go for the foreign nationals who often come here and just manage 
to do quite well despite the circumstances. [2] 
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3.5. Crafting strategies and alliances to provoke and respond to conflict 
 
In all the examined cases, the responses to the conflicts were fashioned by multiple 
actors, interacting with each other according to both formalised and personal 
connections. It is, therefore, important to draw a distinction between the organisations 
SHUVHDQGWKHLQVWLWXWLRQVRULQ'RXJODVV1RUWK¶VZRUGVWKHµUXOHVRIWKHJDPH¶1RUWK
1990) shaping the relations among the involved actors. By looking at the institutional 
framework, it is indeed possible to understand whether democratic principles apply to 
ERWKWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQV¶LQWHUQDOVWUXFWXUHDQGORFDOFRQILJXUDWLRQRISRZHUDQGWRZKDW
extent local conflicts, and context-based approaches to conflict resolution, reveal the 
legacy of structures and logics predating the democratic transition. At the same time, 
highlighting alliances and the interplay of different organisations enable us to clarify 
the design and implementation of strategies to counter or contain the violence and 
create spaces of engagement. 
 
For instance, examining Serbian conflicts, organisational logics appear informed by 
the self-preservation of power structures. The continuity between the 0LORãHYLü era and 
present times is evident when looking at both the protection that authorities from the 
previous regime still enjoy from current politicians and security officers and the 
mindsets that inform the notion of power, the role of the executive power and the 
relation with the media. This was brought to the fore in the case of the arrest of 
0LORãHYLü and in the case of the Ombudsman. As suggested by an interviewee: 
 
it was clear that all members of the former regime had the protection of the most 
popular politician in Yugoslavia. I think this marked the death sentence to Zoran 
ĈLQÿLü DVVDVVLQDWHG RQ  0DUFK  EHFDXVH XS XQWLO WKDW QLJKW HYHU\
Hague inductee, the Red Berets, every evildoer, none of them knew whether they 
would end up in The Hague. [5] 
 
Several interviewees suggested the existence of a shadow structure of power, tracing 
back to 0LORãHYLü times, and resisting accountability, in terms resonating the concept 
RI µGHHS VWDWH¶ GLVFXVVHG LQ UHODWLRQ WR FRXQWULHV VXFK DV 7XUNH\ *LQJHUDV 
Söyler, 2013) and Egypt (Norton, 2013; Faris, 2013), in which unelected, corporatist 
networks involving the armed forces and large business advance and protect their 
interests away from public scrutiny and behind a formal democratic façade. In the 
Ombudsman case, the smear FDPSDLJQEHJDQDV6DãD-DQNRYLüEHJDQLQYHVWLJDWLQJ
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the political role and the corruption web centred on the Military Security Agency[16], 
thus threatening a deeply entrenched µpyramid of power that pulls in and misuses state 
institutions DQGSDUW\VWUXFWXUHV¶ [12]. 
 
7KHVPHDULQJFDPSDLJQVWDUWHGRQFH-DQNRYLüZDVVHHQDVKDYLQJWUHVSDVVHGDUHG
line drawn before the 2000 and, since then, never challenged. Therefore, although the 
attacks were personal, they aimed more broadly at setting an example: 
 
WKHRPEXGVPDQUHFHLYHGD\HOORZFDUGIURPWKHJRYHUQPHQW³:HDUHSRZHUIXO
DQGZHKDYHDFFHVVWRDOOLQIRUPDWLRQRQ\RX´>@7KH\FDQGRWKLVWRDQ\RQH
They operate in a grey zone where there are countless possibilities for various 
manipulations. So, I just see this conflict as another attempt of the government to 
strengthen its ruling position. [2] 
 
The response of the government echoed the tactics of the secret police during socialist 
WLPHVMXVWOLNHLQ7LWR¶VWLPHVZKHQWKHUHZDVDVD\LQJµthe secret intelligence service 
VHHVDQGNQRZHYHU\WKLQJ¶[10]. 
 
Despite the prominence of political parties, there is, therefore, a widespread perception 
that politics is done behind the scenes, by actors, such as the military intelligence, 
pulling the strings, or through informal connections between political leaders and their 
followers. This dynamic was evident during the riots in the aftermath of 0LORãHYLü¶V
extradition and against the LGBT Pride, when nationalist leaders called to 
demonstrate: 
  
groups of several thousands RI\RXQJPHQWKDWZHFDQ¶WUHDOO\FDOOIRRWEDOOIDQV
because of course, football is not a priority to them... Their collective behaviour 
is their priority, association and feeling of some nationalist strength and belonging 
to a group, whatever they feel. At one moment someone encouraged them, told 
WKHP ³2EVWUXFW WKH SDUDGHQRZ´ DQG DW VRPH RWKHUPRPHQW WKH\ WROG WKHP
³1RZGRQ¶W´>@ 
 
What we see at work, in the Serbian cases, were forms of patronage through which 
politicians, particularly from radical parties, mobilise their supporters to exert pressure 
on the government. In the Kenyan contexts, these relations are seen through an ethnic 
lens, but, all the same, ended up contributing to polarising the society as political 
leaders who are rushing back to their tribal cocoons to marshal voters to back them for 
power [7]:  
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«SROLWLFDO LQFLWHPHQW WULEDOLVP RI FRXUVH WKH\ ZHUH YHU\ PXFK XVHG E\ WKH
leaders. You know these political leaders they used their tribal power as a 
weapon to be elected. And off course they could manipulate young people with 
money «>1] 
 
As a local leader pointed out:  
 
Nobody called people to fight, but that opportunity opened some unknown 
problems that the society has been masquerading and putting mask that things 
are okay yet they DUHQ¶WDQGWKDWRSSRUWXQLW\ZDVMXVWDWULJJHU>@ 
 
In the Kenyan cases, the organisations involved in the conflicts under examination 
were both state and non-state actors. In fact, the institutional arrangements that 
emerged, or became manifest, were characterised by a tight relation on the 
interdependence between formal and informal leaders, against a background shaped 
by the political and economic influence of foreign donors. During the 2008 post-election 
violence, the involvement of community leaders was made necessary by the lack of 
preparedness and the shortage of resources of state actors as the violence broke out, 
as confirmed by the spokesperson of the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and 
Constitutional Affairs who, despite the civic educatiRQLQLWLDWLYHVWRµSUHSDUHSHRSOHIRU
WKHHOHFWLRQV¶XQGHUOLQHGµfinancial constraints, personnel constraints, and the like¶ [1]. 
On top of that, the violence that followed the announcement of the incumbent president 
Mwai Kibaki as the winner of the election was a reaction not only to perceived rigged 
election but also to state bodies seen as delegitimised. Therefore, the response had to 
necessarily be fashioned by involved actors who were still deemed trustworthy. 
Churches and religious leaders were instrumental in both providing assistance to 
people displaced by the violence and providing a space for civic education and 
dialogue [9]. Government agencies relied on community leaders to regularly gather 
intelligence [6]. In general, trust in respected members of the community played a 
greater role than trust in state apparatus as religious and community leaders 
commanded greater authority than state officials, could better monitor the escalation 
of social tensions and leverage long-lasting relations built within the community. 
However, as the relevance of community leaders in conflict resolution became evident 
WRWKHH[WHQWRIVKDSLQJGRQRUV¶SROLFLHVLWOHGWRDSUROLIHUDWLRQRIRUJDQLVDWLRQVZKLFK
rebranded themselves non-governmental organisations (NGOs) according to the 
circumstances. According to a representative of government: 
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The organisations like the church, the civil society organisations, they are there 
but coordination between them is not very strong. You will find a civil society 
organisation there but they are not working together, you will find people there 
RQO\IRUWKHLUVHOILVK>VLF@ LQWHUHVWV«%XWZKHQWKH86HPEDVV\LVFRPLQJWR
Kisumu to talk about the elections you will see hundreds and hundreds of NGOs, 
you will wonder where they are coming from. [11] 
 
As a result of the 2008 post-election violence, increased government and civil society 
awareness and donor pressure placed greater emphasis on preparedness ahead of 
2013 election to avoid the repeat of similar unrests. State authorities also took stock of 
the lessons drawn from the 2008 post-election violence to engage with local 
stakeholders to map outbreaks of violence through regular intelligence gathering. 
Government officials reached out to religious members of the NCCK (National Council 
of Churches of Kenya) and local chiefs to discuss relevant issues in barazas [10]. A 
spokesperson of the Ministry of Information explains the strategy used to craft a 
message tailored to specific settings: 
 
We talk to religious leaders because they are the people who are with those 
people, they understand those logistics. It is also good to note that most people 
do not fight when religious leaders bring that message because they trust them 
more than even the village elders and the chiefs. It is actually religious leaders 
ZKRDOHUWXVLIWKHUHLVDQ\WKLQJWKH\WKLQNLVQRWJRRG«)LUVWZHJRWRWKHJURXQG
and assess, we have the chiefs, the village elders, we talk to them and we get 
the feeling on the ground. After getting the feeling of what is going on on the 
ground, we now package a message according to how you want to send it, if the 
ground is hostile we normally use the students, it is normally easy to catch the 
attention of students and those same students will take that message back home. 
[8] 
 
Moreover, special emphasis was placed on particular demographic segments, such as 
women µbecause we realised that the women had a greater role to play through the 
network of the church¶ [9] and the youth. In this case, specific initiatives were designed 
using innovative forms of engagement, such as football tournament, and tapping into 
funding from international donors, such as USAID [1]. These kinds of partnerships 
between the state and non-state actors were forged also during the anti-terror 
campaign Usalama Watch. Some state officials claimed to have reached to Somali 
businessmen in Eastleigh: 
 
We told them that they have to report any suspicious characters living in their 
midst or we are going to have a collateral damage. That is what has happened 
now, us being taken to Kasarani. So we told them that it is our responsibility as 
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Kenyans and people who love peace because we cannot have business in 
Eastleigh if we have no peace. So being the hub of business in Nairobi, mostly 
the business men we've told them to take up the initiative, the Eastleigh Business 
Association we told them to take the security issues seriously... [22] 
 
Similar to Kenya, in the South African cases engaging with communities was made 
necessary by the challenges faced by the police to tackle the xenophobic violence and 
the service delivery protests. These challenges were due, at the same time, to a lack 
of resources and a deficit of trust. In doing so, state representatives had to deal with 
what Robertson (2010) calls the µprofessionalisation of the protest¶ (19), a direct effect 
RI WKH VWURQJ LQIOXHQFH WKDW ZRUNHUV¶ XQLRQV KDYH retained over South African 
grassroots politics. Regarding service delivery conflicts, protest marches expressed 
long-standing anger for poor living conditions, as previously argued, but also presented 
an opportunity for community leaders to emerge µbecausHSRWHQWLDOO\LWPHDQVWKH\¶OO
end up as a counsellor or they're challenging power structures within their own 
organisation where they will cynically set out to harness protests¶ [7]. This remark 
allows one to critically look at the emphasis often placed on the concept of local 
community, as a social group whose internal hierarchies are the result of democratic 
practices. As a municipal worker pointed out, many community leaders seeking to 
engage with local administrations were self-appointed [4], prompting state 
organisations to look for alternative ways to get their messages across: 
 
In the past we used to deal with community leaders and we realised that they 
GLGQ¶W VHQG WKHPHVVDJH WKURXJK «6R we went directly to the communities 
GXULQJWKLVFRQIOLFWDQGWKDW¶VWKHVWUXFWXUHWKDWZHXVHG$QGZHXVHGDOVROLNH,
VDLGZHLQYLWHGFRPPXQLW\ OHDGHUVWKDWZH¶YH LGHQWLILHGDVWKHFKXUFKOHDGHUV
and invited them into parliament, so we met with them and explained to them. [4] 
 
Also, in some cases, community leaders were part of the problem by fuelling the flames 
or encouraging and inciting violence, as became particularly evident during the 
xenophobic violence, when these leaders blamed foreigners as well for unfair 
competition in the job market, and depriving the South African youth of employment 
opportunities. 
 
As a security officer commented, µ7KH\¶UHQRWVHHLQJVRPHWLPHVWKHELJJHUSLFWXUH«
if we were not getting mediation taking place within the community leaders, we would 
just arrest the ring leaders. So we would take the fire out¶ [3]. 
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Eventually, poorly planned community meetings backfired by offering enraged leaders 
a stage to address the crowd and incite mob violence [3]. Most interviewees 
acknowledge the need to improve the early warning system currently in place, 
recognising the limits of the police in monitoring the exacerbation of tensions at the 
local level: 
 
There are officials that are on the ground that are working with these communities 
on a daily basis and they do the physical verification, and those things - they do 
all those things - and then boom! It happens. So, it means in our systems we 
need something to be able to detect these things before it becomes an 
uncontrollable rumour. [18] 
 
7KH 6RXWK $IULFDQ FDVHV ZHUH DOVR FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V WRS-down 
VWUDWHJ\ LQFOXGLQJ D µFDUURW DQG VWLFN¶ DSSURDFK ZKLFK EDODQFHG WKH GHSOR\PHQWRI
security forces to quell outbreaks of violence with conflict resolution practitioners 
outreach to affected communities. As a spokesperson for the police put it, during 
service delivery conflicts: 
  
It was successful sometimes to use full force in such instances and then coupled 
with positive messages on the airways to reach out to people to sa\µORRNOHW¶V
FDOPGRZQ¶. So force and communication. [9] 
 
A similar approach was used also during the 2008 xenophobic violence, when the 
police used a two-fold response: mediation through community leaders and, if that 
GLGQ¶WZRUNRXWUXEEHUEXOOHWVVWXQJUHQDGHVDQGWHDUJDV>@7KHVHFXULW\IRUFHVZHUH
called to respond to the violence coming not only from protesters but also, in some 
instance, from the citizens affected by the disruption. A conflict resolution practitioner 
working for a local administration recalled a situation in which he had to negotiate with 
a group of citizens discussing how to deal with the demonstrators µonce and for all¶, 
even suggesting µLet the gangsters go deal with them¶ [4]. However, the police are 
RIWHQ EODPHG IRU EHLQJ XQDEOH WR VWRS WKH YLROHQFH EHIRUH LW VSUHDG WKURXJK µEXVK
tHOHJUDSK¶6RPHLQWHUYLHZHHDWWULEXWHVWKLVLQFDSDFLW\WRWKHµG\VIXQFWLRQDO¶VWUXFWXUH
of the South African Police Services, whose ranks swelled during the preparation for 
the World Cup and the police: 
 
started taking people that were not qualified and should never be doing the job, 
purely because World Cup put pressure on SAPS to have numbers. So, they 
dropped their standards of enrolment and that caused a problem for them. And 
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that spirals across as a direct translation to lack of training to violence. The less 
DSHUVRQWUDLQHG WKHTXLFNHUKHLVJRLQJWRUHVRUW WRYLROHQFHDQGWKDW¶VEHHQ
proven. [3] 
 
Therefore, very often, the security forces ended up contributing to the escalation of the 
crisis by using excessive force.  
 
Like in the Kenyan cases, on the one hand religious leaders were seen as more 
UHOLDEOHRQWKHRWKHUUHFUXLWLQJ\RXQJSHRSOHDVµGLJLWDODPEDVVDGRUV¶ZDVDVWUDWHJ\
used to reach out to a critical segment of the population, more exposed to frustration 
because of rampant unemployment and therefore more prone to violence. For 
instance, the JohanneVEXUJ¶VPXQLFLSDOLW\UHFUXLWHG 
 
about 1000 young people whose job it is everyday to knock on people's doors 
and teach people the basics of the internet. And so we use those young people 
in those conflicts, because they're already on the ground, they know the local 
people, and they're an extension of the resources that one would need in these 
situations. You have to find a way of getting young people active and involved. 
They are fascinated by technology and technology gets them excited - they are 
paid a daily stipend. [18] 
 
3.6. Role of the media 
 
Media have different and often diverging roles in the conflicts under examinations. An 
important aspect that emerges from the analysis of the different cases, though, is the 
need to consider media outlets as actors with their own rationality, and whose framing 
of stories of public interest may at times be based on market logics, or more personal 
agendas, rather than on the alignment with the political agenda either of the 
government or the opposition. According to the circumstances, political drivers can 
dominate economic reasons or can coincide which each other. In Serbia, for instance, 
media are largely seen through a political prism as a key instrument to build consent 
and sway public opinion according to a precise political agenda. Underlying this view 
of the relation between the media and the government there is, according to many 
interviewees, a hierarchical mindset that is rooted in Serbian political organisations and 
it is also evident in how political actors make use of the media: 
 
LWVHHPVWKDWHYHU\WKLQJLVLQWHUSUHWHGLQDPDQQHULQZKLFK³\RXDUe either our 
DOO\RURXUHQHP\EHFDXVHLW¶VLPSRVVLEOHWKDW\RXDUHMXVWWU\LQJWRGR\RXUMRE´
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7KLV LVDSX]]OHWKDW WKH\DUH LQFDSDEOHRIVROYLQJ7KH\MXVWFDQ¶WEHOLHYHWKDW
someone is just trying to do their job. [18] 
 
This was particularly evident in the case of the smear campaign against the 
2PEXGVPDQ $Q LQWHUYLHZHH VXSSRUWLQJ 6DãD -DQNRYLü UHFRXQWHG KRZ WKH DWWDFNV
against him quickly escalated: 
  
7KH2PEXGVPDQJDYHDQLQWHUYLHZIRU1HGHOMQLN«DQGKHVDLGVRPHWKLQJVLQ
that interview that made some people feel uncomfortable. The very next day 
,QIRUPHUUHYLWDOLVHGWKHH[DFWVDPHVWRU\ZKLFKFRQFHUQVKLVIULHQG¶VVXLFLGHDQG
this story went through a renaissance of its own, as Informer is keen on portraying 
WKLVVXLFLGHDVDPXUGHUWKDW6DãD-DQNRYLüFRPPLWWHGDQGLWDLPVWRDFFXVHKLP
of being a murderer or a participant in that suicide, simply speaking. So this story 
ZLOOEHEURXJKWXSHYHU\WLPH6DãD-DQNRYLüXWWHUVVRPHWKLQJWKDWVRPHRQHHOVH
PLJKWQRWOLNH´ 'UDJDQ-9XþLüHYLüHGLWRULQFKief and the owner of Informer was 
the key actor. Had there been no Informer, there would have been no smear 
campaign. [12]  
 
The attack was coordinated across different media and, in the words of the interviewee 
ZDVYHU\µG\QDPLF¶ 
 
in the sense that they learned from their mistakes, which means that they 
adjusted their strategy accordingly. So, they went from that brutal story about that 
suicide, which did not stick as well as they would have hoped, to a strategy of 
faking social dialogue and faking pluralism so that they could continue with their 
abuse. [12] 
 
The case of the Ombudsman polarised the media and the public opinion, so that, to 
FRXQWHU WKHFDPSDLJQ UDQE\ ,QIRUPHUDQG3LQN6DãD-DQNRYLüZDVQDPHGDV WKH
person of the year by another magazine, Vreme. Informer and Pink were considered 
HPEHGGHG LQ WKH µS\UDPLGRISRZHU¶ SUHYLRXVO\PHQWLRQHG WKH UHDO ORFXVRISRZHU
behind democratic institutions, but, according to some interviewee, out of economic 
convenience rather than of ideological affinity. An interviewee claimed that: 
 
a newspaper that receives 30,000,000 dinars from a certain party for campaign 
ads will also publish articles in favour of that party because it did not receive as 
much money from the opposing party. So big parties could afford such things, as 
WKH\KDGWKHSRZHUWKH\KDGWKH³ULJKWIULHQGV´TXRWDWLRQPDUNVLQFOXGHGWKH\
knew businessmen that controlled large corporations. [2] 
 
In the case of the LGBT Pride Parade, media were blamed by right wing politicians for 
stirring the tensions between LGBT activists and anti-gay rights in order to µportray the 
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progressives as if they still belonged to the so-called nationalist and rightist parties and 
so on, and the aim of this was to raise the so-called democratic capacities of the 
Democratic Party¶ [18]. Moreover, right-wingers accused the media of plotting to 
undermine Serbian values and silencing their arguments. The coverage of the LGBT 
Pride was seen through a political lens and linked to the endorsement of a globalist 
ideology: 
 
Some media outlets that were protected and controlled by the west, and this is 
VWLOO WKH FDVH WRGD\ « 7KH LQWHUHVWV RI WKH SUR-western and pro-government 
PHGLDRIWHQRYHUODS«(YHU\WKLQJZDVEHLQJDPSOLILHGDQGRYHU-emphasised at 
that time. [18] 
 
In South Africa, political DXWKRULWLHV¶ state officers and ANC apparatchiks largely 
accused media of an anti-government slant. An ANC representative claimed that 
media had been hostile to the ruling party since 1994 and that the unfortunate reality 
is in the media space, the media has more sympathy for the trade unions than they 
have for government and as a result of that narrative, so more coverage given to trade 
unions because the trade unions were seen as the poor workforce [6]. 
 
,QWHUHVWLQJO\ZKHQGHYHORSLQJKLVDUJXPHQWWKDWPHGLDµVKRXOGEHGHYHORSPHQWDO¶KH
explained that they µshould understand the objective of the ruling party in South Africa 
which is to create a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous society ... united 
RQWKLV¶ [6]. Instead, echoing an argument already found in the analysis of other cases, 
µmedia have got their own agenda¶ 
 
It is important to note that there is a difference in the way media are seen by officers 
at the local and at the national level. Given the importance of personal connections to 
get favourable coverage, officers in Johannesburg reported that the relationship µis 
YHU\JRRG«EHFDXVHPRVWRIWKHKHDGRIILFHVRIWKHVHPHGLDKRXVHVDUHKHUH:H
do go and do office visits, in studio visits so that they know us, we know them, we know 
who we're talking to when the phone rings, and so forth... so we know each other on a 
first-name basis¶[18]. On the contrary, national government representatives, based in 
Pretoria, complained that the physical distance between political and media 
organisations hinders partnership: 
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0RVWRIWKHPHGLDDUHLQ-REXUJDQGZHDUHLQ3UHWRULDDQGZHGRQ¶WVHHWKHP
except for press conferences, which is not really a time to get to know media. So 
you need to do more than that. They need to understand where you come from, 
you need to understand where they come from, that kind of thing. What are they 
looking for? So you need to have lots more engagement. [14] 
 
While the degree of media control varies according to the institutional settings, there is 
a phenomenon on which most interviewees from Serbia, Kenya and South Africa seem 
WRDJUHHWKHJURZLQJµWDEORLGLVDWLRQRIWKHPHGLD¶UHVXOWLQJLQWKHGHWHULRUDWLQJTXDOLW\
of the information and, in general, in the involution of the media landscape. 
Sensationalist language and framings are regarded by a Serbian interviewee as the 
weapons in a µwar (..) fought with disinformation, not by providing better quality 
information¶ [17]. So, in Serbia, the most popular media outlets have reportedly 
embraced an approach to informaWLRQWKDWRIWHQHQGVXSDGGLQJµfuel to the fire¶ [15]. 
According to this perspective, catchy headlines to polarise the public discourse were 
finalised to win readers. As one interviewee put it: 
 
bad news is always good news for the reporters, because people read about it. 
So if they had focused on the good aspects of the parade, if they wrote about 
how the parade finally took place and who participated and such, those would 
have probably been the least popular media. [15] 
 
Interestingly, someone suggested a sort of mutual reinforcement in the radicalisation 
of politicians and media. As some interviewees say with reference to Kosovo: 
 
DWRQHPRPHQW >,@JRWWKH LPSUHVVLRQWKDW.RãWXQLFD was reading only Politika 
DQG3HþDWDQGWKDWKHVWDUWHGEHOLHYLQJWKDWKHLVWKHRQO\GHIHQGHURI.RVRYR
and that the rest of us are just waiting for him to blink so that we can betray him, 
VRKHHQWHUHGWKDWFDPSDLJQYHU\FRQILGHQWO\ZLWKEDGJHV³.RVRYR LV6HUELD´DQG
³.RVRYRLVWKHKHDUWRI6HUELD>@ 
 
The lack of preparation that hindered the response to state agencies and security 
forces during the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya was an issue also for the media, 
blamed by many interviewees to have contributed to fuelling the violence through a 
mix of sloppy reporting and the emotional presentation of divisive issues. Again, it was 
sensationalist reporting. This attitude was common to both national and international 
media: 
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The media actually fuelled in showing what happened in the streets of Nairobi or 
along the route from Nairobi to the western region of Nairobi. Had it not being 
shown and when the government acted by closing down the television stations 
people opted to start using mobile phones but not to the magnitude that was 
actually there. [7] 
 
As a result, the riots were increasingly framed as tribal, engendering a copycat effect 
on a national scale: 
 
When the media reports and even show pictures of people tormented or houses 
being burnt, you see elsewhere people are also mobilising themselves elsewhere 
to attack those who are attacking their people. They see them as our people and 
others. If our people are being persecuted in that area and we are living with their 
people here, we take revenge. [7] 
 
International media was highly criticised for feeding and contributing to this tribal 
narrative: 
 
2WKHUV«IXHOOHGWKHFRQIOLFWE\DLULQJSKRWRVVKRZLQJFHUWDLQHWKQLFJURXSV
being finished and by mentioning those ethnic groups. I remember even BBC one 
of the overseas radio stations asking leading questions which were very bad, I 
remember them asking this man who was killed who killed him, from what tribe 
and you know when the respondent mentioned the tribe, lots of houses were 
being burned for that particular tribe. So those leading questions are very bad 
and they are very provocative, and incite people. The others are pictures showing 
people being chased, that lead to anger and feeling of retaliating but as churches 
we encourage our people not to retaliate, of course not all people are Christians 
but we encourage them not to retaliate. [10] 
 
Some interviewees would have welcomed a certain degree of censorship to contain 
the spreading of images of violence, which reinforced a zero-sum game view of politics 
in Kenya [6]. In so doing, media were seen by government officers as a potential 
amplifier of violence. Also, speaking about Operation Usalama Watch, a widespread 
perception among Kenyan government officers is that international media were giving 
more coverage to the situation of Somali refugees in the country than to security 
concerns of Kenyan citizens. 
In South Africa, the use of media was informed by the same top-down approach 
previously described. The response of the authorities was at both national and 
grassroots level, partnering with both national broadcast and local radio to 
communicate positive messages [1+3]. The media become themselves part of the 
story when reporters put themselves at risk and they were targeted by criminals, µif 
36 
 
WKH\¶UHFDUU\LQJH[SHQVLYHFDPHUDHTXLSPHQW¶. In the case of service delivery conflicts, 
an officer remembered that: 
 
we tend to have several instances where we ask the media just to be aware that 
their presence was inciting and fuelling situations. Because what happens is the 
guys perform in front of cameras and they get silly and then sometimes it does 
escalate. [3] 
 
,WLVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWDPRQJWKHµJX\VJHWWLQJVLOO\¶WKHVDPHRIILFHUSODFHVVHFXULW\
agents, who are therefore briefed to respect the chain of command to release 
statements to the press. Moreover, by giving prominence to gruesome accounts of 
violence, most mainstream media neglected to highlight positive stories on coexistence 
and civic dialogue. Also, state representatives blamed media, both national and 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO IRU D SHUFHLYHG RYHUXVH RI WKH ZRUG µ[HQRSKRELF¶ ZKLFK WDLQWHG WKH
µ5DLQERZ1DWLRQ´QDUUDWLYHWKDWZDVLQIRUPLQJ6RXWK$IULFD¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOLPDJHDKHDG
of 2012 FIFA World Cup [14].  
 
Also, monitoring media was viewed as part of a broader strategy to mobilise and 
organise a collective response to the violence. For instance, in Kenya, after the initial 
setback, government officers, supported by CSOs, used vernacular radio stations to 
pass on pacifying messages and involve local influencers and opinion makers to 
appeal to their communities [36]. In 2013, the response of both the state and the media 
was shaped by the lesson learned from the 2008 post-election violence, by reinforcing 
the capabilities of media regulators to monitor hate speech and organising training and 
seminars for journalists [6].  
 
Similarly, in South Africa community radios were a key platform to timely deliver 
information and messages to a public unfamiliar with printed media and not always 
with access to TV [17]. They allowed authorities to extend the reach of public meetings, 
which remained the most effective space for engagement. Local media were also 
monitored ± by the BCCSA on the radio front and by the Films and Publications Board 
for other media ± to enable authorities to address and prosecute hate speech. While 
some in the government were accused of inciting the xenophobic violence, the 
government did attempt to respond. Radios were used to spread positive messages 
during the xenophobic violence, through drama, documentaries, and adverts [1]. 
Campaigns were launched to portray migrant workers in a positive light, VXFKDVµ/HW
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WKHPFRPHEDFN¶FRQYH\LQJWKHPHVVDJHWKDWDIWHUWKHYLROHQFH6RXWK$IULFDZDV
once again a welcoming place for African migrants [1]. Messages were also 
EURDGFDVWHGWRµWRQHGRZQ¶WKHUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVRIOHDGHUVLQSURYRNLQJWKHYLROHQFH$V
one government ally suggests:  
 
for instance, claiming that the words of the king of the Zulus King Zwelethini, 
VD\LQJ WKDW ³)RUHLJQHUVZKR DUHGRLQJFULPLQDODFWLYLWLHVPXVWJREDFNKRPH´
ZHUHPLVXQGHUVWRRG³$QGWKHQSHRSOHWKRXJKWQRWKDWPHDQVDOOIRUHLJQHUVPXVW
go home´. You know English is a different language. So I think people 
misunderstood that to mean that hey, all the foreigners must go home. [1] 
 
3.7. The significance of social media 
 
The impact of social media on the broader media landscape and the role they played 
in shaping strategic narratives and facilitating mobilisation varied according to the 
country. In the Serbian cases, the interviewees devoted the most attention to printed 
media and TV shows. Twitter or Facebook were mentioned with reference to the 
2PEXGVPDQ FDVH DV 6DãD -DQNRYLü XVHG 7ZLWWHU WR FRPPXQLFDWH GLUHFWO\ WR KLV
supporters and a group to µ6XSSRUW6DãD-DQNRYLü¶ created a page on Facebook. On 
the other hand, social media helped spread fake news and conspiracy theories, which 
IHG DQ HFKR FKDPEHU HIIHFW DPRQJ VXSSRUWHUV DQG GHWUDFWRUV RI -DQNRYLü DQG
eventually contributed to further polarise the conflict. An interviewee recounted when 
he: 
 
had the opportunity to see a T-VKLUWZLWK6DãD-DQNRYLü¶VIDFHSULQWHGRQLWDQG
this was supposedly a shirt for his presidential elections campaign. As far as I 
know the man has nothing to do with this, but this flooded Facebook. And such 
things are completely counterproductive. And I even believe that this shirt 
VWLPXODWHG,QIRUPHUWRVWDUWZULWLQJDERXW6DãD-DQNRYLü¶VIULHQG¶VVXLFLGHDJDLQ. 
[13] 
 
Moreover, social media have also created a space where the so-called astroturfing 
phenomenon, a sort of coordinated trolling, emerged. The astroturfers were mostly 
youth from the Serbian Progressive Party, social media savvy, who acted as a stand-
by force to attack online different targets with comments when instructed by their 
political referent [13]: 
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They have a programme in which you can see all the news headers and you can 
see exactly what sort of comments you are supposed to post bellow each article 
and they have the entire Serbia covered by this network and they have some 
young people who spend their whole day typing up some meaningless comments 
for fifty, a hundred or two hundred euros, and these comments appear on multiple 
websites in the same form. [13] 
 
In Kenya, besides a greater awareness of the risk of violence, the other key difference 
with the previous elections was the popularity acquired in the while by social media, 
particularly Twitter and Facebook. This presented both opportunities and challenges. 
,W LV ZRUWK FRQVLGHULQJ WKDW VLQFH  D µ6LOLFRQ 6DYDQQDK¶ QDUUDWLYH KDV VWDUWHG
taking shape around the leading role of Kenya as a technology hub in East Africa and 
one of the most dynamic economies in Africa and in the developing world as for digital 
innovation. This narrative had received an institutional endorsement as it was 
enshrined in the Kenya Vision 2030, the couQWU\¶VGHYHORSPHQWDJHQGDDSSURYHGLQ
2008 under President 0ZDL.LEDNLDQGXQGHUSLQQHGWKHVWDWH¶VLQLWLDWLYHVKDUQHVVLQJ
WHFKQRORJ\WRSURPRWHSHDFHDQGQDWLRQDOGLDORJXHDQGRSSRVLWLRQ¶VFRPPXQLFDWLRQ
to engage with the youth on the issues. For instance, CORD, the coalition of opposition 
parties made use of both new and old media, deploying bloggers and social media 
commentators and sharing online information on the schedule of the candidate [36]. 
According to a CORD secretariat officer: 
 
The advantage with the new media is that you will disseminate the information in 
its original form, no censorship and its real time so that you can record the 
FDQGLGDWH¶VVSHHFKDQGWUDQVPLWLWRQVRFLDOPHGLDDQGHYHU\ERG\HOVHZKRLVRQ
social media would be able to share that information and we had several pages 
on social media, both on Twitter and Facebook which we operated with a huge 
following. [36] 
 
Although the emphasis was placed on democratic forms of protest, Kenyan opposition 
saw in social media an opportunity to discuss structural issues that would be otherwise 
blanketed by the dominant peace rhetoric. As argued by the same officer: 
 
Instead of giving the country the true position of what had happened in the 
election, they (mainstream media) departed from that and started playing peace 
PHVVDJHVDQGSHDFHIXOVRQJV$QGWKDW¶VQRWZKDWWKHHOHFWRUDWHZDQWHG>@ 
 
Social media, however, were considered a double-edged sword. Despite providing 
state bodies, CSOs and political parties a platform to quickly disseminate messages, 
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they also still present significant obstacles when it comes to monitoring hate speech, 
with the risk that, along with useful and reliable information, they will also help 
disseminate inflammatory rumours and coordinate violence, even strengthening 
tribalism. As a political activist from Kisumu pointed out: 
 
tribal clashes have moved from running with pangas in the streets to the social 
media. And these people are expressing their depression and everything, and if 
there is any opportunity hell breaks loose, these people from the way they are 
interacting on social media will put this practical on any person they will see 
around. [7] 
  
Social media were largely seen as an arena of discussion mostly for younger, urban 
segments of the population. As a security officer observed: 
 
The issue is that the social media level does not really reach down to [s] because 
the main perpetrators here, it will happen at the grassroots with the poor. Those 
SHRSOHGRQ¶WKDYHDFFHVVWR7ZLWWHUDQGLIWKH\KDYHRQFacebook, the reality of 
all that literacy then will be a problem. [9]  
 
The limited popularity of social media in areas affected by the xenophobic violence 
played in favour of the security forces, otherwise unable to monitor Twitter and 
Facebook. Union leaders acknowledged the difficulty to control the information flow on 
social media, as µyou can very easily throw out a threat or you can very easily publish 
inflammatory remarks without any consequences¶ [10]. However, in service delivery 
conflicts, a mixed strategy was used, disseminating messages on community 
newspapers, billboards, on pamphlets in various languages [10], and radio to 
announce the time and place of community meetings, since face-to-face interactions 
are still considered the most effective form of communication in townships [4]. At the 
same time, unions and grassroots organisations have become increasingly aware of 
the importance of ICTs and social media, µto immediately reach members of the public 
and allow for two-way feedback simultaneously¶ and µto influence public perception¶ 
[10] during conflicts. Since communication is at the core of the strategy of protest 
movements, media savviness is seen as a crucial skill to craft the narrative and, as 
previously said, frame the action as legitimate and aligned with constitutional values. 
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4. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Despite obvious differences due to the local specificities, a comparative analysis of the 
conflicts examined in each MeCoDEM country provides insights on key moments in 
democratisation struggles which reveal continuity and changes at an institutional level, 
the reluctance of established elites to surrender their grip on power, the entanglement 
of values and vested interested and the mutual shaping of power structures and 
narratives, as the latter are emanation of the former and, simultaneously, are used to 
legitimise existing hierarchies and forms of deference and subordination to the 
authority. In each case, framing the past sets the stage for interpreting the current 
situation and building a vision of the future that becomes an issue on the political 
agenda. The interviewees conveyed narratives that made sense of the historical path 
taken by local political institutions and attributed to their country a specific place in the 
world. In the three countries, the source of legitimacy of the parties involved in the 
conflicts, either as competing factions or peace brokers, is placed in either 
transcendent values or the rule of law. In a few instances, these two sources of 
legitimacy coincide. The formers can refer to religious precepts, such as Christian 
guidelines in the case of Kenya, an idealised national identity or culturally-ingrained 
norms, such as Serbian traditions or South African Ubuntu; the latter points to the 
adherence to the values enshrined in the Constitution. In Kenya and South Africa, for 
instance, interviewees from both the ruling and the opposition parties, state officers, 
and community leaders claim higher moral ground by framing their action in legalistic 
terms.  
 
A common feature of the conflicts under examination is the fact that they are all seen 
as the catalyst of underlying tensions and deep-seated frustrations. In all cases, these 
frustrations are rooted in situations of inequality resulting from unresolved issues, 
tracing back to an era predating the democratic transition, which coincides with the end 
of the 0LORãHYLü¶VUHJLPHLQWKHFDVHRI6HUELD ,QGHSHQGHQFHLQWKHFDVHRI.HQ\D
and the end of Apartheid, in the case of South Africa. Democratisation appears as an 
unfinished process in the three countries, as the tensions between authoritarian 
structures of power and institutions based on representative democracy are brought to 
the fore by contingent issues. Moreover, media outlets appear as actors with their own 
agenda, and their relationship with the government can be tactical, rather than 
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strategic, thus driven by calculations of convenience rather than by ideological affinity. 
These calculations might be related to the expectation of material benefits either from 
political actors, such as money for campaign ads that, according to a Serbian 
interviewee, some newspapers received from major parties [2], or from the market, in 
terms of an increase in readership or viewers. A widespread idea, emerging from the 
interviews, is that sensationalism, or, as it is also called, the tabloidisation of the media 
strongly contributes to exacerbating violence and debasing the political debate: it aims 
at stirring emotions while reducing the space devoted to the analysis of the background 
causes of the conflicts. It also propagates superficial interpretations that further 
entrench pre-existing biases. And, yet, it is a growing tendency, particularly in the 
Serbian and Kenyan cases, driven by a drop in the sales and the crisis of consolidated 
business models, which pushes the press to go after µFDWFK\¶ news. Some South 
African interviewees, for instance, suggested that market pressures not only tested the 
boundaries of quality journalism, but also forced politicians and state authorities to 
compete for limited attention by using increasingly polarising tones and arguments. 
Further research ought to be done to understand whether the tabloidisation of the 
media contributes to shape, consolidates or simply reflects a winner-takes-all attitude 
which characterises the political competition.  
 
So, while the cases here examined confirm that µin transitional societies the media are 
frequently a major battleground for power struggles, as politicians, media owners and 
other groups try to gain control over the media agenda andXOWLPDWHO\SXEOLFRSLQLRQ¶
(Voltmer and Kraetzschmar, 2015: 8), it is also useful to consider the media not only 
as a battleground but as a stakeholder with well-defined interests that can be aligned 
with political agendas according to the circumstances.  
 
The comparative analysis also offers a glimpse into the use of social media for 
mobilising supporters online and thus reproducing forms of patronage and power. 
There is some irony in the fact that ICTs, often hailed as instruments to expand the 
arena of public debate and thus create an informed public able to hold political leaders 
to account, can be used by political factions who in fact challenge the notion of checks 
and balances at the core of liberal democracies. 7KH HYLGHQFH RI µDVWURWXUILQJ¶ RU
trolling in Serbia on the part of youth from the Serbian Progressive Party and the 
spread of spread fake news and conspiracy theories around the Ombudsman case are 
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not isolated. While our interviews in Kenya did not pick up on similar trends on these 
specific conflicts, an analogous phenomenon of serial callers particularly around 
elections when politicians pay callers to regularly phone in support to radio 
programmes or spread key messages, is a prevalent and growing phenomenon. The 
rise of fake news in the 2016 US elections has certain made such issues a pressing 
global challenge for social media companies and governments to urgently address. 
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